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INCREASING INVESTOR PROTECTION
THROUGH IMPROVING HEDGE FUND
VALUATION
DEIRDRE FARRELL †
INTRODUCTION
A retired police officer makes ends meet with the pension he
earned while serving his community for twenty years on the
force. A first-generation American becomes the first person in
her family to attend college with the help of a full scholarship
from her university. A charity sends funds for much needed
medical supplies after a natural disaster strikes in a foreign
country. What do all of these scenarios have in common? The
funds used to pay for the retired police officer’s pension, the
student’s university tuition, and the medical supplies all derived
from investments in hedge funds.
When most people think of hedge funds, they often think of a
mysterious, complicated investing entity only accessible to the
elite and ultra-rich. However, the industry has evolved from its
exclusive beginngings. Institutional investors, such as public
and private pension funds and educational and charitable
endowments, now make up a sizable portion of hedge fund
investors. 1 While institutional investors may benefit from access
to more exotic alternative investments such as hedge funds, any
losses they suffer could profoundly affect the lives of millions of
everyday Americans.
Today, hedge funds manage over $3 trillion dollars in assets
worldwide. 2 These funds enjoyed little regulation for most of
†
Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review, J.D., 2018, St. John’s
University School of Law; B.A. 2011, University of Maryland, College Park.
1
Cary Martin Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still Private? Exploring Publicness in
the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L. REV. 405, 408 (2016).
2
Melissa Karsh, Hedge Fund Assets Pass $3 Trillion in 2016 for First Time:
Chart, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 23, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2017-01-23/hedge-fund-assets-pass-3-trillion-in-2016-for-first-timechart.
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their history and the time leading up to the financial crisis of
2008. 3 After the crisis, governments sought to reign in the
financial services industry and used this opportunity to increase
regulation of hedge funds. 4 In the United States, the DoddFrank Act required hedge fund managers to register with the
government for the first time. 5 While this registration improved
the transparency of the hedge fund industry in the United
States, 6 it did not go far enough to prioritize investor protection.
A hedge fund’s valuation of the assets it manages is particularly
important for protecting investors, and the current limited
oversight of the valuation process leaves room for improvement.
This Note examines the current hedge fund regulations in the
United States and in Europe, and proposes ways for regulators to
improve hedge fund valuation in the United States to increase
investor protection. Although valuation issues affect all pooled
investment vehicles that invest in illiquid, difficult-to-value
assets, this Note focuses only on the valuation systems of hedge
funds.
Part I gives an overview of hedge funds in general—their
structure and the major stakeholders involved.
Part II
summarizes the valuation process and its associated issues. Part
III describes recent regulatory changes in the United States
affecting hedge funds, including the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and
the JOBS Act of 2012. Part III also discusses recent changes in
European regulation of Hedge Funds. Finally, Part IV proposes
changes to the existing framework in the United States to
improve transparency and standardize the valuation process for
hedge funds. Part IV also discusses cost concerns of these
proposals.

3
Emily Kehoe, Hedge Fund “Regulation” for Systemic Risk: Largely
Impossible, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 35, 36 (2013).
4
Id.
5
Wulf Kaal & Dale Oesterle, The History of Hedge Fund Regulation in the
United States, COLUM. L. SCH. BLUE SKY BLOG (Feb. 29, 2016), http://clsbluesky.law.
columbia.edu/2016/02/29/the-history-of-hedge-fund-regulation-in-the-united-states/.
6
Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Hedge Funds – A New Era of
Transparency and Openness, Speech at Managed Funds Association Outlook 2013
Conference (Oct. 18, 2013) (transcript available at sec.gov).
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HEDGE FUNDS: A BACKGROUND

Defining a Hedge Fund

Although hedge funds account for over $3 trillion in assets
worldwide, 7 the definition of what constitutes a “hedge fund” is
somewhat fluid. 8 Generally, hedge funds are characterized as
pooled alternative investment vehicles, with high minimum
investment requirements, serving wealthy and sophisticated
investors. 9 For most of their history, hedge funds enjoyed little
regulation and oversight from regulators across the globe,
allowing them the freedom to pursue flexible investment
strategies, such as investing in derivatives and short selling,
through an unlimited range of investments. 10 Unlike more
traditional pooled investment vehicles, such as mutual funds,
hedge funds use high amounts of leverage. This practice allows
hedge funds to invest with borrowed money, thereby amplifying
potential returns or losses. 11
Hedge funds have increased in popularity over the past
several decades. 12 At the turn of the millennium, the hedge fund
industry managed approximately $500 billion in assets. 13 That
amount has steadily increased, breaking the three trillion dollar
mark in 2015. 14 During the global financial crisis of 2008,
investors flocked to hedge funds because of their ability to

Karsh, supra note 2.
TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, HEDGE FUNDS OVERSIGHT
FINAL REPORT 4 (2009) (“[T]here is no consistent or agreed-upon definition of the
term hedge fund . . . [A]n approach for identifying these types of entities is to look at
the kinds of characteristics of and strategies employed by institutions that would
consider themselves to be hedge funds.”); STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS viii (2003) (“[A]n entity
that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets that does not register its
securities offerrings under the Securities Act and which is not registered as an
investment company under the Investment Company Act.”).
9
Harry McVea, Hedge Fund Asset Valuations and the Work of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), 57 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 1, 4 (2008).
10
Id. at 5.
11
Id.
12
Mary Childs & Miles Johnson, SEC’s Pursuit of Leon Cooperman Rattles
Hedge Fund Industry, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016, 7:38 PM), https://www.ft.com/
content/d10eadba-80db-11e6-bc52-0c7211ef3198.
13
Id.
14
Id.
7
8
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diversify risk and beat market returns in a downturn. 15
Although hedge funds have failed to beat market returns for the
past several years, 16 they remain popular among investors and
continue to see an inflow of new investment. 17
B. Hedge Fund Structure
Hedge funds consist of three major players: the fund itself,
the hedge fund manager or management company, and the
investors. 18 Most hedge funds in the United States operate as
limited partnerships, 19 with the hedge fund manager serving as
general partner. 20 As general partner, the hedge fund manager
executes the investment strategy and manages the fund’s
operational practices. 21 Hedge fund managers usually hire “csuite” officers, such as a chief executive officer, a chief financial
officer, and a chief compliance officer, to manage the operations
of the business. Hedge fund managers also typically form
committees to oversee the risk and valuation functions of the
hedge fund. 22
In exchange for managing the investment portfolio and the
operational aspects of a fund, hedge fund managers typically
charge a “two and twenty” fee whereby managers receive annual
compensation of two percent of total assets under management
(“AUM”) and twenty percent of profits from those assets, earned
above a predetermined benchmark. 23 Additionally, most hedge
funds’ governing partnership agreements require the
See Shelby, supra note 1, at 430; Lawrence Delevingne & Svea HerbstBayliss, Public Pensions Stick with Hedge Funds Despite Frustrations, REUTERS,
May 10, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-hedgefunds-pensionfunds-idUS
KCN0Y12I0.
16
Childs & Johnson, supra note 12 (Hedge funds as a whole failed to beat the
S&P 500 from 2012-2016). Several large U.S. pension funds, including plans for
California’s, New Jersey’s, and Philadelphia’s employees, have scaled back
investments in hedge funds. Id.
17
Shelby, supra note 1, at 430; Delevingne & Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 15.
18
Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Fund Governance, 19 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN.
141, 150 (2013).
19
Id.; Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge
Fund Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3261 (2009).
20
Shadab, supra note 18.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 151.
23
See Lindsay Fortado, Hedge Fund Investors Question ‘2 and 20’ Fees, FIN.
TIMES (June 6, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/291081ba-49df-11e7-a3f4-c742b97
91d43.
15
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management company to invest some of its own money into the
fund. 24 Both of these provisions, the “two and twenty” fee and
the requirement that management be personally invested in the
fund, seek to align the manager’s incentives with the investors’
incentives—to maximize returns. 25 The vast majority of hedge
funds do not have a board of directors to act as a watchdog over
the fund managers, as they would in a typical corporation or in
Nevertheless, fund
many limited liability corporations. 26
managers still owe fiduciary duties to the fund itself. 27
Investors, on the other hand, serve as limited partners in a
hedge fund limited partnership, providing capital to the fund but
relinquishing nearly all managerial control to the fund
managers. 28 Investors’ only true decision-making power lies in
their wallets—in the amount of capital they choose to invest with
a particular fund, and in their decision whether or not to
withdraw that money over time. 29 Unlike mutual funds and
other pooled investment vehicles, hedge fund operating
agreements generally require investors to lock-in their capital for
a period of time, with typical lock-in periods ranging from less
than a quarter to a full year. 30 Hedge fund operating agreements
also generally only permit investors to withdraw funds on a
periodic basis, such as quarterly or semi-annually. 31
Additionally, managers often maintain discretionary power to
bar withdrawals for a period of time. 32 Hedge fund managers’
ability to lock-in investors’ capital for at least a short period of
24
Most hedge funds require the managers to invest their own funds as a way
to offset the additional risk investors take on. Sklar, supra note 19, at 3266. Under
the “two and twenty” management fee arrangement, hedge fund managers share in
a funds’ profits, but not in its losses. Shadab, supra note 18, at 166.
25
Sklar, supra note 19, at 3266.
26
Kehoe, supra note 3, at 45.
27
Shadab, supra note 18, at 151.
28
Although limited partnerships have the ability to give voting rights to
limited partners, hedge fund partnership agreements usually do not give investors
this power. Id. at 153. Therefore, investors do not have the ability to vote for or
remove management, as is often the case with other forms of investment funds. Id.
29
Id. at 153–54.
30
Publically registered mutual funds are required to redeem shares to
investors within seven calendar days. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e) (2012).
31
Shadab, supra note 18, at 154.
32
Id. Hedge fund agreements usually require investors to “give thirty to ninety
days’ notice before withdrawing” funds. Id. Funds may also limit the amount of
capital an investor may withdraw at any one time, usually stipulated as a
percentage of the value of the fund, and/or “limit redemptions to a portion of the
investor’s own capital.” Id.

FINAL_FARRELL

154

9/10/2018 1:54 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:149

time provides management with some flexibility in pursuing its
investment strategy by preventing destabilizing liquidity
problems. 33
C. Accredited Investors
Another defining feature of hedge funds is that, as private
funds, they are restricted to investments from “accredited
investors.” 34 In Regulation D Rule 501 of the Securities Act of
1933, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) defines
an accredited investor, in the context of a natural person, as
someone who has (1) income that exceeded $200,000, or $300,000
together with a spouse, in each of the prior two years, or (2) a net
worth exceeding $1,000,000, either alone or together with a
spouse. 35 The SEC’s definition of an accredited investor also
encompasses institutional investors. This category includes
banks, insurance companies, and employee benefit plans, as well
as charitable organizations, corporations, partnerships, and
trusts with assets in excess of five million dollars. 36
Congress limits hedge funds to accredited investors under
the theory that persons or entities who meet these criteria can
bear the economic risk associated with investing in these
alternative investment vehicles. 37 Further, since only accredited
investors can invest in hedge funds, many policymakers argue
against expending precious government resources to regulate or
monitor hedge funds in the name of investor protection.
However, these policymakers fail to recognize that average
Americans provide a significant amount of the investment capital
for many of these accredited institutional investors. As a result,
hedge funds’ investment decisions profoundly impact the lives of
countless Americans.

Id. at 155.
As private funds, hedge funds are excluded from the definition of an
“investment company.” 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2012). Private funds may not make a
public offering of their shares and, as a result, are limited to “accredited investors”
in order to allow for a private offering complying with Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. §
230.506 (2017).
35
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)–(6) (2017).
36
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1) (2017).
37
OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR
BULLETIN: ACCREDITED INVESTORS 1 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_
accreditedinvestors.pdf.
33
34
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For instance, millions of Americans rely on hedge fund
investments to fund their pensions: forty-two percent of the 242
institutional investors that made up the “$1 billion club,” defined
as institutions that had at least $1 billion of capital invested in
hedge funds in 2016, 38 were either public or private pension
funds. 39 The Public School & Education Employee Retirement
Systems of Missouri invested twelve percent of its $38 billion in
hedge funds. 40 Similarly, the San Francisco City & County
Employee’s Retirement System voted to increase its investment
in hedge funds from five percent to fifteen percent in September
2017 and expects to have $3.15 billion invested in hedge funds by
the end of 2018. 41 Essentially, the dedicated teachers of Missouri
and civil servants of San Francisco, among millions of others, are
relying on hedge fund investments to ensure their financial
security in retirement.
Additionally, endowments and foundations made up another
significant portion of the “$1 billion club,” accounting for fifteen
percent of these heavy-hitter institutional investors. 42 These
same endowments and foundations fund charities and
educational institutions in the U.S. and around the world.
Combined, public and private pension funds, foundations, and
endowments, account for over fifty percent of hedge funds’ largest
institutional investors. In other words, how hedge funds invest
these organizations’ capital significantly affects millions of
Americans from all socioeconomic statuses. 43
These institutional investors are fueling much of the growth
the hedge fund industry is experiencing. The number of public
pensions that invest in hedge funds grew from 234 in 2010 to 282
in 2016, and “[t]he average percentage of pension portfolios in

Preqin, The $1Bn Club: Largest Investors in Hedge Funds, 9 HEDGE FUND
SPOTLIGHT, no. 1, 2017, at 1, 5, http://docs.preqin.com/newsletters/hf/Preqin-HedgeFund-Spotlight-May-2017.pdf. “The $1Bn Club” institutional investors account for
$805 billion dollars invested in hedge funds. Id.
39
Id.
40
Delevingne & Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 15.
41
Randy Diamond, San Francisco Allocates $250 Million to 3 Managers,
Proposes Hedge Fund Ramp Up, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Oct. 10, 2017),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20171010/ONLINE/171019982/san-franciscoallocates-250-million-to-3-managers-proposes-hedge-fund-ramp-up-searches-andhires?template=print.
42
Preqin, supra note 38, at 6.
43
Id.
38
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hedge funds has also r[isen] to nearly ten percent.” 44 While it is
true that institutional investors generally enjoy a higher level of
sophistication than a typical individual investor, the level of
sophistication across institutional investors varies, 45 and even
the most sophisticated institutional investor cannot overcome
incomplete or bad data, both of which can arise from a lack of
regulation or oversight. 46
II. INVESTOR PROTECTION: VALUATION OVERVIEW
With this structure in mind, there are several areas of
concern regarding investor protection under the current hedge
fund governance and regulatory model. Chief among these
concerns are how hedge fund managers value a fund’s
investments and the potential conflicts of interest that exist in
this process.
A.

Fair Value Accounting and Valuation

After the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), which is responsible for
developing the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(“GAAP”) in the United States, clarified existing rules for

Delevingne & Herbst-Bayliss, supra note 15.
See Jongho Kim, Can Risks Be Reduced in the Derivatives Market? Lessons
from the Deal Structure Analysis of Modern Financial Engineering Debacles, 6
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 29, 45–48 (2007) (describing the bankruptcy of Orange
County, CA caused by the municipality’s investments in risky derivatives, and
explaining that “the main cause of Orange Country's failure in the use of derivatives
lay . . . in the people who acted without knowledge of them”); Saul Hansell, Bankers
Trust Settles Suit with P.&G., N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/
1996/05/10/business/bankers-trust-settles-suit-with-p-g.html (“Procter & Gamble
was perhaps the most prominent corporation to contend that it did not understand
the risk of derivatives after its two deals with Bankers Trust lost value very rapidly
in 1994.”).
46
See Tom Loftus, Lawsuit: Retirement Systems Gambled on Hedge Funds,
Concealed Its Financial Mess, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Dec. 27, 2017, 2:25 PM),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/27/lawsuit-kentuckyretirement-systems-gambled-hedge-funds/982740001/. In December 2017, Kentucky
state employees sued retirement system officials and three hedge fund managers,
alleging breach of fiduciary duties when the managers “lur[ed]” the retirement
system into making investments in the funds “without fully disclosing the high
risks, massive fees and lack of transparency.” Id. These investments failed to pay off,
leaving the retirement system that services 360,000 state employees with a deficit of
billions. Id.
44
45
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measuring and accounting for an asset’s fair value. 47 Fair value
is defined as the price that would be received to sell an asset
between market participants at the measurement date. 48 Under
the new rules, assets are classified into three levels based on
their liquidity, 49 or the relative ease with which the asset can be
converted into cash. 50 On one end of the spectrum, level one
assets, such as stocks and bonds, have observable quoted prices
for identical assets in active markets. 51 On the other end, level
three assets, such as derivatives and distressed debt, are
generally highly illiquid assets for which there is no observable
market pricing. 52 Level two assets lie somewhere in the middle. 53
In an ideal valuation scenario, an asset is freely traded in a
deep, liquid market (level one) and, therefore, the asset’s fair
value is easily identified on any given day as its current
exchange-traded price. 54 However, for more illiquid assets (levels
two and three), accurately valuing the asset is far less
straightforward. A number of variables must be considered,
including the “[v]alue of similar financial instruments,” the
“[r]eliability of estimates,” the reliability of financial modeling
used, and the “[r]easonableness of assumptions,” among others. 55
As a result, “[d]etermining [f]air [v]alue where no exchangetraded price exists is more of an art than a science, as a number
of assumptions and estimates must be made.” 56 As alternative
investment vehicles, almost half of a hedge fund’s assets typically
fall within the difficult-to-value asset categories, levels two and
Daisy Maxey, If a Security Isn’t Trading, What Is It Really Worth?, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 4, 2014, 1:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-looking-at-how-altern
ative-funds-value-investments-1391096281?tesla=y.
48
FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT, Accounting Standards Codification No. 820,
§ 10-20 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2015).
49
Id. § 10-50-2.
50
Accounting Liquidity, NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/
a/accounting-liquidity (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
51
FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT, Accounting Standards Codification No. 820,
§ 10-20 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2015).
52
Id.
53
Id. § 10-35-48. Level 2 assets include assets with (1) “quoted [market] prices
for similar assets or liabilities in active markets”; (2) quoted prices for identical or
similar assets in inactive markets; or (3) “inputs other than quoted prices that are
observable for the asset.” Id.
54
ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N (AIMA), AIMA’S GUIDE TO SOUND PRACTICES FOR
HEDGE FUND VALUATION 45 (2013).
55
Id.
56
Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
47

FINAL_FARRELL

158

9/10/2018 1:54 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:149

three. 57 Therefore, a significant portion of most hedge funds’
valuations
of
their
assets depends on judgment calls about how to accurately and
consistently account for these variables. Such judgment calls are
“susceptible to abuse.” 58
B. Valuation Concerns
An accurate valuation of a hedge fund’s assets is critical for
several reasons.
First, funds measure and report their
performance to investors based on how the fair value of their
portfolio assets change over time. 59 Current investors look to a
fund’s performance when deciding whether to keep their capital
with the fund, and potential new investors consider a fund’s past
performance 60 when deciding whether or not to invest with the
fund. 61 Within the past several years, regulators at the SEC
have expressed concern that some managers might be
exaggerating the performance of holdings to entice new
investors. 62
Second, hedge fund managers are compensated based on the
net asset valuation and the performance of the fund. 63 While this
form of compensation is intended to align the hedge fund
managers’ interests with the investors’ interests, it also creates a
conflict of interest by possibly incentivizing managers to mark up
the fund’s valuation to increase their compensation. 64 Since
many of a hedge fund’s assets are categorized as level two and
Id. at 8 (reporting that a representative sample of AIMA’s hedge fund
members had thirty percent level two investments and thirteen percent level three
investments).
58
Maxey, supra note 47.
59
See supra Part II.B.
60
Although past performance of a fund is not an accurate indicator of future
outcomes, investors continue to weigh heavily a fund’s past performance when
choosing where to invest their capital. McGraw Hill Fin., Does Past Performance
Matter? The Persistence Scorecard, S&P DOW JONES INDICES 1, 2 (2015),
https://us.spindices.com/documents/spiva/persistence-scorecard-june-2015.pdf.
61
ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N (AIMA), supra note 54, at 17. “From the [i]nvestor’s
perspective, fair valuation is the foundation on which analysis of the portfolio’s
performance and volatility of returns is based . . . . [A]n [i]nvestor would normally
expect that the amount of cash paid to take an equity interest in the portfolio and
the amount of cash received on withdrawal of an equity interest is based on a formal
and fair valuation of the portfolio’s assets and liabilities.” Id.
62
Maxey, supra note 47.
63
Sklar, supra note 19, at 3265.
64
Id. at 3269.
57
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three assets, their valuation is dependent on a number of
variables and judgment calls, making them more vulnerable to
manipulation by a fund’s management. 65
Finally, under the current U.S. hedge fund regulatory
scheme, no single organization has the authority to develop and
enforce mandatory valuation standards. 66 Although various
organizations have produced valuation guidelines, none carry the
force of law in the United States. 67 Therefore, there is little
standardization and oversight of the valuation process even
though valuation plays a key role in the hedge fund business,
making it difficult for investors to comprehend and compare fund
valuations. 68
III. RECENT CHANGES IN HEDGE FUND REGULATION AND
CURRENT INDUSTRY VALUATION PRACTICES
A.

United States Hedge Fund Regulation – Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 was the single most sweeping piece of
legislation affecting hedge funds in the United States in the past
several decades. 69 Passed in the wake of the 2008 global
financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act sought to improve all aspects
of the financial services industry by preventing fraud, increasing

See supra Part III.A.
See generally Hossein Nabilou & Alessio M. Pacces, The Hedge Fund
Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs. Indirect Regulation, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 183
(2015).
67
Competing authorities include the Alternative Investment Management
Association, which published its Guide to Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Valuation
(ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N (AIMA), supra note 54); the Hedge Fund Standards Board,
which issued principles in 2015 (THE HEDGE FUND STANDARDS (HEDGE FUND
STANDARDS BD. 2015)); the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute’s Global
Performance Investment Standards (GLOBAL PERFORMANCE INVESTMENT STANDARDS
(CFA INST. 2010)); and the International Organization of Securities Commission’s
(“IOSCO”) Hedge Fund Principles (TECH. COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM’NS, supra note 8).
68
See generally Joshua Rogers, All Hedge Funds May Not Be Bad – Here’s How
to Suss Yours Out, FORBES (Apr. 1, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/joshuarogers/
2013/04/01/all-hedge-funds-may-be-bad-heres-how-to-suss-yours-out/#72c5e9a65a89.
69
Cecilia C. Lee, Reframing Complexity: Hedge Fund Policy Paradigm for the
Way Forward, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 478, 480 (2015).
65
66
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investor protection, and limiting systemic risk. 70 Although
experts disagree as to the level of involvement hedge funds had
in the global financial crisis, 71 legislators viewed the Dodd-Frank
financial services reform bill as an opportunity to close
regulatory loopholes that persisted after previous failed attempts
to register hedge funds with the federal government. 72
Prior to Dodd-Frank, many hedge fund managers escaped
registration through a series of exemptions included in the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 73 However, Title IV of DoddFrank, entitled the Private Fund Investment Advisers
Registration Act of 2010 (“PFIARA”), removed most of these
exemptions, forcing hedge fund managers to register with the
government. 74 Under the provisions in PFIARA and rules issued
by the SEC in 2011, hedge fund managers with more than $150
million in assets under management are required to register as
Dodd-Frank also
investment advisers with the SEC. 75
authorized the SEC to promulgate rules requiring enhanced
disclosure for hedge fund managers. 76
Under the new Dodd-Frank registration rules, hedge fund
managers, as investment advisers, are required to maintain and
70
Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act,
50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 243, 262 (2013).
71
See Reint Gropp, How Important Are Hedge Funds in a Crisis?, FED. RES.
BANK OF S.F. ECON. LETTER (Apr. 14, 2014), https://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/files/el2014-11.pdf (arguing that hedge funds play a prominent role in
transmitting shocks to the rest of the financial market and, thus, may amplify
systemic risk more than previously thought). But see Kaal, supra note 70, at 248
(“[H]edge funds were not identifiable as the culprits for the financial crisis.”).
72
In 2004, “the SEC, using its rulemaking authority under the Investment
Advisers Act, issued a [formal] rule requiring hedge fund [managers] to register
under that [A]ct.” Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 5. The rule spurred significant
resistance from the hedge fund industry. Id. In July 2006, the D.C. Circuit vacated
the hedge fund rule in Goldstein v. SEC, calling the rule arbitrary rulemaking. Id.
Most hedge fund advisers who had registered under the 2004 registration rule
promptly deregistered. Id.
73
Most relied on the “small firm” exception. Id. 15 U.S.C.A. § 80a–3(c)(1)
(2010).
74
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 403 124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006))
(striking the private adviser exemption under section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act,
thereby precluding many private fund advisers from avoiding registration).
75
Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers
With Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private
Advisers, 76 Fed. Reg. 39646-01, 39666–67 (July 6, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203(m)-1).
76
Kaal & Oesterle, supra note 5.
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file records and reports with the SEC containing information
such as the hedge fund’s total assets under management, its use
of leverage, valuation methodologies, types of assets held, and
other information deemed “necessary . . . for the protection of
investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.” 77 Additionally,
as part of registration, hedge fund managers must make such
records available for periodic inspections by the SEC. 78
The Dodd-Frank Act also created the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (“FSOC”) to monitor systemic risk to the U.S.
financial system. 79 The SEC and Commodities Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC”) together created the Form PF to collect the
information proscribed in Title IV of Dodd-Frank and to assist
the FSOC “in monitoring [hedge funds’] risk to the U.S. financial
Information reported on the Form PF is kept
system.” 80
confidential once filed with the government; however, the
government may use information reported in its examinations
Funds with assets under
and enforcement actions. 81
management exceeding $150 million, but less than $1.5 billion,
are required to file the Form PF annually, and funds with assets
exceeding $1.5 billion are required to file quarterly. 82
Under post-Dodd-Frank regulations, many hedge fund
managers now must also complete the Form ADV. 83 Part One of
Form ADV requires funds to disclose general information about
the investment adviser, including information about its
employees, clients, compensation, the value of assets under
management, custodians, and ownership and control. 84 Reponses
to Part One are publicly available. 85 Part Two of Form ADV is
only distributed to the government and investors and contains
15 U.S.C § 80b-4(2), (3)(H) (2012).
Id. § 404(b)(6).
79
Id. § 111.
80
SEC. & FUND SERV. PRIME FIN., Form PF The Impact on Private Advisers,
CITIBANK 1, 1 (2012), https://www.citibank.com/mss/docs/Impact_on_Private_
Fund.pdf.
81
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, GUIDE TO SEC INVESTMENT ADVISER
REGISTRATION FOR HEDGE FUND AND PRIVATE EQUITY FUND MANAGERS 18–19
(2012), https://www.morganlewis.com/alerts/2011/02/~/media/e87b98c6bc794d3fb2e1
dd629dc5de11.ashx.
82
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF 1–2, https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/
2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf [hereinafter FORM PF].
83
Kehoe, supra note 3, at 46; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV,
https://www.sec.gov/files/formadv.pdf.
84
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, supra note 81, at 9; Kehoe, supra note 3, at 45.
85
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, supra note 81, at 9.
77
78
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information regarding an investment advisers’ business and
funds managed, conflicts of interest, and advisory personnel. 86
B. United States Hedge Fund Regulation - JOBS Act of 2012
In addition to Dodd-Frank, the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (“JOBS”) Act of 2012 shaped the hedge fund regulatory
landscape by ending the solicitation ban for private companies
relying on Rule 506 of Regulation D. 87 Before the JOBS Act,
hedge funds and other private issuers were largely prohibited
from engaging in any form of advertising for their investments. 88
However, hedge funds can now market themselves to a broader
audience. 89 While many view the removal of the solicitation ban
under the JOBS Act as a positive step towards transparency,
critics see it as an opportunity to “lure unsophisticated
investors,” including less sophisticated institutional investors, 90
into a world of complicated investments “they do not fully
understand and cannot easily leave.” 91
C. Changes in Regulation Outside of the United States – AIFMD
European Approach
The United States was not the only country propelled by the
global financial crisis to reexamine regulation and oversight of
the hedge fund industry. The European Union responded by
creating the Alternative Investment Fund Managers’ Directive
(“AIFMD”) in 2011. 92 The AIFMD is a regulatory framework
requiring registration and enhanced reporting for alternative
Id.
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a), 126
Stat. 306, 313–314 (2012).
88
Cary Martin, One Step Forward for Hedge Fund Investors: The Removal of
the Solicitation Ban and the Challenges that Lie Ahead, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1143,
1145 (2014). Prior to the JOBS Act, private issuers, including hedge funds, were
allowed to raise unlimited capital but only from accredited investors, and, in doing
so, were largely restricted from advertising to the general public as to preserve the
private nature of the investments. Id.
89
Alexandra Stevenson, With Ban on Ads Removed, Hedge Funds Test Waters,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/with-ban-on-adslifted-hedge-funds-test-waters/?_r=1.
90
See supra Part II.C and notes 45–46.
91
Stevenson, supra note 89.
92
Kehoe, supra note 3, at 36; Directive 2011/61, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 8 June 2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and
Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No
1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1.
86
87

FINAL_FARRELL

2018]

9/10/2018 1:54 PM

INCREASING INVESTOR PROTECTION

163

investment fund managers (“AIFMs”), including managers of
hedge funds and private equity firms. 93 The aims of the AIFMD
include (1) preventing market instability and the buildup of
systemic risk in the Eurpean financial market; (2) improving
investor protection through increased investor disclosure and
mandatory reporting; and (3) harmonizing rules across member
states to improve efficiency and level playing fields. 94 Entities
affected by the directive were given until July 22, 2014 to comply
The directive applies
with the directive’s mandates. 95
generally to AIFMs who are based in the European Union, to
AIFMs who manage alternative investment funds (“AIFs”) based
in the European Union, and to AIFMs who market AIFs within
the European Union. 96
Similar to the Form PF, the AIFMD grants exceptions to
registration for AIFMs with assets below a certain threshold. 97 If
the fund is leveraged and has less than €100 million in assets
under management, or unleveraged and less than €500 million in
assets, the fund’s advisors are exempt from registration
altogether. 98
In terms of valuation, the AIFMD regulates the processes
and procedures that AIFMs must follow, rather than prescribing
substantive rules. AIFMs must either hire an external valuation
expert to value its portfolio performance and assets under
management, or they must create an in-house valuation team
that is functionally independent from the portfolio managers. 99
Under the directive, if a fund chooses to use in-house valuation
staff, the AIFM must ensure that it takes proper measures to
mitigate any potential conflicts of interest and disclose them
93
AIFMD,
FINANCIAL
CONDUCT
AUTHORITY
(Apr.
13,
2017),
https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/aifmd.
94
Id.
95
DUFF & PHELPS, Enhancing Independence: How Can Fund Managers
Comply with AIFMD Valuation Requirements, VALUATION INSIGHTS, 1, 4 (2015),
https://www.duffandphelps.com/-/media/assets/pdfs/publications/valuation/valuationinsights/q2-2015-valuation-insights.ashx.
96
The directive applies to (1) “EU[-based] AIFMs which manage one or more
AIFs” (whether EU or non-EU AIFs); (2) “non-EU AIFMs, which manage one or
more EU AIFs;” and (3) “non-EU AIFMs which market one or more AIFs in the
[European] Union” (whether EU or non-EU AIFs). Council Directive 2011/61, art.
2(1), 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1.
97
Id. at art. 3(2).
98
Id.
99
AIFMD Factsheet: Valuation, MATHESON 1 (2016), http://www.matheson.
com/images/uploads/publications/AIFMD_Factsheet_Valuation.pdf.
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where they exist. 100 In instances where the AIFM elects to use
in-house valuation staff, regulators retain the power to require
the AIFM to undergo verification of valuation by an external
valuation expert or auditor. 101 If an AIFM chooses to appoint an
external valuation expert, the AIFM must demonstrate that the
external party is professionally recognized and can furnish
professional guarantees. 102 Regardless of whether the AIFM
appoints an external valuation expert or utilizes in-house
valuation staff, the AIFM retains ultimate responsibility and
liability for the calculation of the fund’s net asset value and the
proper valuation of the fund’s assets. 103
The directive prescribes that an AIFM determine the
valuation methodologies that will be used for each type of asset
in which the AIFM will invest. 104 These methodologies must be
applied consistently, and the policies and procedures for
valuation must be reviewed at least annually. 105 Additionally,
the directive requires AIFMs to provide investors with a
description of these valuation methodologies, including “the
methods used in valuing hard-to-value assets.” 106
The directive further requires the AIFM to file an annual
report with their home state regulators and to distribute the
report to investors upon request. 107 Unlike the Form PF,
information contained in the AIFM annual report includes the
fund’s investment strategies, trading techniques, leverage
sources, and kinds of assets held. 108
D. Current Valuation Practices in the United States
Although Europe’s regulations provide substantial detail for
the process of hedge fund valuation, regulations in the United
States have left this area untouched. 109 As a result, hedge fund

Id.
Id.
102
“[W]hat constitutes as ‘professional guarantee’ is not defined under the
AIFMD.” Id.
103
Id. at 2.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Directive 2011/61, art. 23(1)(g), 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1.
107
Kehoe, supra note 3, at 53.
108
Id.
109
See generally Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 66.
100
101
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managers are self-policing when it comes to the valuation of a
fund’s assets. 110
In the field of public accounting in the U.S., the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) produces the Generally
Accepted Accounting principles (“GAAP”), which all public
companies must adhere to in their accounting methods and
preparation of financial statements. 111 However, no analogous
authoritative body exists in the U.S. for alternative investment
Instead, in hedge fund valuation, competing
valuation. 112
authorities issue guidance and principles, none of which carry
the force of law in the United States. 113 Therefore, even the most
sophisticated investors find themselves at a disadvantage when
performing due diligence on prospective hedge fund investments
because they have no guarantee that the information they are
comparing is actually comparable. As discussed previously in
this Note, the SEC officially has the authority to demand
inspection of any registered hedge fund’s records at any time. 114
However,in reality, the SEC lacks the person-power to use this as
a meaningful enforcement mechanism for valuation. 115
Practically speaking, this leaves a large gap in investor
protection.
E. Recent Hedge Fund Valuation Cases and Enforcement
Actions
Recent cases brought by the SEC and DOJ against hedge
fund managers highlight weaknesses in the current valuation
process that are most ripe for improvement through regulation.
The first weakness is the possibility of direct manipulation of a
funds’ assets by the hedge fund managers. In December 2016,
the SEC charged the founder and managers of Platinum
Partners, a one billion dollar hedge fund, with “conducting a
Hedge funds are still subject to general prohibitions against fraud and
managers owe a fiduciary duty to the funds they manage. OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. &
ADVOCACY, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, INVESTOR BULLETIN: HEDGE FUNDS 1 (2013),
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ib_hedgefunds.pdf.
111
About the FASB, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., http://www.fasb.org/
facts/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
112
See supra Part III.B and note 67.
113
See supra Part III.B and note 67.
114
See supra Part IV.A.
115
Francis J. Facciolo, Do I Have a Bridge for You: Fiduciary Duties and
Investment Advice, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 101, 149 (2014).
110
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fraudulent scheme to inflate asset values and illicitly move
investor money to cover...liquidity problems.” 116
By the end of 2014, eighty percent of Platinum’s assets were
illiquid “level three” assets. 117 Management touted its use of an
independent valuation agent to investors. 118 In reality, the fund’s
founder and Chief Investment Officer, Mark Nordlicht, often
instructed his staff to adjust the values of various positions up or
down, leaving the staff to flesh out the rationales for the
adjustments. 119 Although the fund’s auditor in 2015 reported
that a “material weakness” existed in the fund’s valuation
process of level three assets, management never disclosed these
findings to investors, and subsequently terminated the auditor. 120
Platinum’s control over valuations allowed the managers to
substantially overstate the value of the fund’s largest assets. 121
Platinum’s managers began operating the fund like a Ponzi
scheme by misrepresenting the fund’s performance to lure in new
investors, and then using the new investors’ capital to pay out
redemptions to old investors. 122
The second observable weakness from recent cases is the
possibility of a lack of independence of third parties offering
comparable price inputs. In November 2015, former portfolio
manager Michael Balboa was convicted and sentenced to four
years in prison for manipulating the valuation of Nigerian debt
held
by
his
fund,
Millennium
Global
Investments
123
The fund held positions in thinly traded,
(“Millennium”).
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Platinum Funds and
Founder with Defrauding Investors (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2016-267.html#.
117
Complaint at 16, SEC v. Platinum Management (NY) LLC, 2017 WL
5634983 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2016) (No. 16-CV-06848).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
In one instance, Platinum’s overstatement of an oil company, Golden Gate
LLC, resulted in an overstatement of thirteen percent of the fund’s total assets
under management in 2014. Id. at 3.
122
Alexandra Stevenson, Platinum Hedge Fund Executives Charged with $1
Billion Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/
business/dealbook/platinum-partners-hedge-fund-founder-and-6-others-chargedwith-fraud.html.
123
United States v. Balboa, 622 F. App’x 31, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2015); Nate
Raymond, Ex-Millennium Global Fund Manager Loses U.S. Fraud Appeal,
REUTERS, Nov. 18, 2015, 11:40 AM, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-crimebalboa-idUSKCN0T72ES20151118.
116
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illiquid Nigerian debt. 124 Pursuant to Millennium’s Valuation
Service Agreement, Millennium engaged GlobeOp Financial
Services (“GlobeOp”), an independent valuation services firm, to
act as the firm’s valuation agent and calculate the Fund’s net
asset value each month. 125 For illiquid assets with no observable
trading market to compare prices, GlobeOp solicited opinions of
brokers or counterparties trading similar securities to determine
the most accurate valuation. 126 Balboa suggested GlobeOp
consult Gilles De Charsonville, a counterparty working in
emerging market debt at a broker-dealer, to provide valuations
on fifteen to twenty of Millenniums’ difficult-to-value
securities. 127 GlobeOp used De Charsonville because Balboa and
De Charsonville held De Charsonville out as an independent
source. 128 However, unknown to GlobeOp, De Charsonville
agreed to provide GlobeOp with prices supplied by Balboa and
present them as his own findings. 129 The scheme lasted for over
a year and caused the fund’s value to be overstated by eighty
million dollars in August 2008. 130
In addition to these cases, in the past several years, the SEC
has launched a series of investigations into other hedge funds
According to SEC
related to their valuation process. 131
Enforcement Director Andrew Ceresney, the SEC considers
valuation a “core issue[]” when looking for hedge fund manager
misconduct. 132
Raymond, supra note 123.
SEC v. Balboa, No. 11 Civ. 8731 PAC, 2015 WL 4092328, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
July 6, 2015).
126
Id.
127
Id. at 2.
128
Id. at 1.
129
Id. at 2.
130
Raymond, supra note 123. In a similar case, the SEC fined Alphabridge
Capital Management and its owners five million dollars for inflating the value of its
holdings of mortgage-backed securities by colluding with broker-dealers to supply
favorable price quotes to the fund’s auditors. Carmin Germaine, SEC Fines
Alphabridge Capital $5M Over Inflated MBS Prices, LAW360, (July 1, 2015),
https://www.law360.com/articles/674630/sec-fines-alphabridge-capital-5m-overinflated-mbs-prices.
131
In May 2016, the SEC was investigating RD Legal Capital LLC, Platinum
Partners LP, and Visium Asset Management, LP. Rob Copeland and Aruna
Viswanatha, Wall Street Cops to Hedge Funds: Treat Investors Better; Regulators
Ramp Up Scrutiny, with Investigations Focusing on How Thinly Traded Investments
Are Valued, WALL ST. J. (May 9, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fundstreatment-of-investors-gets-new-scrutiny-1462808155.
132
Id.
124
125
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IV. PROPOSED CHANGES TO IMPROVE UNITED STATES
REGULATIONS FOR HEDGE FUNDS
Registration of hedge funds under the Dodd-Frank Act was a
step in the right direction, helping to shed light on this
mysterious, shadowy industry. The increased reporting has
provided the government with a clearer picture of the industry 133
and allowed regulators to better analyze the systemic risk
associated with the industry. 134
However, the registration
requirements under Dodd-Frank leave room for improvement in
the area of investor protection. With billions of dollars from
pension funds, charitable foundations, and educational
endowments tied up in hedge funds, the SEC should prioritize
investor protection in its efforts to regulate the industry going
forward. This Note argues that the best way to do so is through
focusing on hedge fund valuation practices and mitigating
related conflicts of interest.
First, the SEC should follow the lead of the AIFMD and
promulgate rules that would require hedge funds to establish
transparent independent valuation functions. Similar to under
the AIFMD, funds could achieve this independent valuation
function through two methods: either by (1) outsourcing all of
valuation calculations to a qualified external valuation expert, or
(2) creating an internal valuation function that is functionally
independent of the portfolio managers. 135 If funds chose to retain
the valuation function in-house, they should be required to
produce written valuation policies and procedures, detailing the
segregation of duties and internal controls in place to ensure the
highest level of independence and separation from portfolio
managers. 136 These written procedures should be kept current,
distributed to the government on at least an annual basis, and
made available to investors upon request.
In her speech to the Managed Funds Association Outlook conference in
2013, SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated “We knew that there was a gap in our
knowledge. But, we did not know how many hedge fund managers existed . . . . Until
[Dodd-Frank], we did not know that we had not accounted for one-third of the
industry.” Speech by Mary Jo White, supra note 6.
134
SEC Chair Mary Jo White stated that the non-public data on hedge funds’
risk profiles reported in the Form PF allows regulators to monitor the industry’s
systemic risk. Id. “Using this information, regulators can then assess trends over
time and identify risks as they are emerging.” Id.
135
DUFF & PHELPS, supra note 95.
136
ALT. INV. MGMT. ASS’N, supra note 54, at 15.
133
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Further, the SEC should distinguish between larger funds,
which account for the majority of the hedge fund industry and
can afford to shoulder greater regulatory costs, and smaller funds
for which additional reporting requirements would constitute a
significant burden. Specifically, the SEC should require large
funds, with at least $150 million in AUM that choose to perform
valuations in-house, to have those valuations reviewed
periodically by an external third-party valuation expert. 137 This
$150 million threshold aligns with the SEC’s current threshold
for private funds that are required to register with the SEC and
file a Form PF. 138 Also like the Form PF requirements, funds
with greater than $150 million in AUM should be required to
undergo this external review annually, while funds with greater
than $1.5 billion in AUM should be required to undergo this
review quarterly. 139 The results of these external reviews should
be filed with the SEC and made available to current investors.
Involving external valuation experts will help add
transparency and independence to the complicated valuation
process. In fact, many hedge funds already engage external
valuation experts in some form for these very reasons. 140
However, currently, these experts are engaged by hedge funds
voluntarily, and no mechanism exists to provide a check on the
valuations conducted by external valuation experts. Therefore,
concerns persist as to the expert’s independence and power, as
with Platinum Partners and Millennium Global Investments. 141
To add credibility to the work of external valuation experts,
Congress should create a private fund industry governing body.
This body would act under the power and oversight of the SEC
and would be responsible for periodically reviewing the work of
the external valuation experts (essentially a review of the
reviewers). The organization could mimic the structure of the
Public Company Auditing Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), a similar
governing body that oversees the public accounting industry. 142
Id.
FORM PF, supra note 82.
139
Id.
140
Maxey, supra note 47.
141
See supra Part IV.E.
142
The PCAOB is responsible for regulating accounting auditors of public
companies. About the PCAOB, https://pcaobus.org/About (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
Members are appointed by the SEC and the SEC maintains oversight of the board’s
rules, standards, and budget. Id.
137
138
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This new, private fund governing body would be responsible for
registering qualified external valuation experts; periodically
reviewing the work of these experts; and issuing valuation
standards.
This would promote investor protection and
transparency by instilling confidence in investors and
eliminating problematic competing valuation standards. 143
Investors could be confident that when they compared valuation
and performance of various funds, the funds were using the same
standards and metrics. The governing body should also follow
the lead of the PCAOB by requiring external valuation experts to
periodically change the partner or managing director leading the
external valuation, thereby increasing the likelihood that any
material misstatements would be identified over time as the
partners leading the external valuation rotated. 144
Although these proposed changes in regulation would
provide greater transparency and confidence to investors and the
government, hedge funds will likely express concern over
implementation and compliance costs. This is a legitimate
concern, particularly at a time when hedge funds have seen a dip
in investment returns. 145 The discussion of costs should be
broken into two sections: (1) the cost of creating independent
valuation functions at the fund level, and (2) the creation of an
industry governing body to oversee valuation at an industry
level.
First, the proposals relating to the creation of an
independent valuation function at the fund level essentially
proposes to use what is already considered industry best
practices and mandate them. 146 Additionally, the valuation
proposals closely align with the valuation requirements found in
the AIFMD. 147 Therefore, hedge funds that fall within the scope
of the AIFMD have, at least partially, already complied with

See supra note 67.
The PCAOB requires public accounting firms to rotate audit partners and
engagement quality review partners every five years to aid in the detection of any
material misstatements in the financial statements. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 203, 116 Stat. 745, (2002) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 78j-1)
145
Several large U.S. pension funds, including plans for California’s, New
Jersey’s, and Philadelphia’s employees have scaled back investments in hedge funds
as returns have declined in recent years. Childs & Johnson, supra note 12.
146
Maxey, supra note 47.
147
See generally Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1 (EC).
143
144
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these standards since July 2014. 148 Further, the majority of
hedge funds already engage external valuation experts in some
form because investors demand it. 149
Second, the creation of an industry governing body could
follow the lead of the PCAOB and be financed by its members. 150
The PCAOB requires all publicly traded companies to share the
cost of the accounting support fee that funds the PCAOB. 151 The
proposed private fund governing body could do the same,
requiring all hedge funds with net asset valuation above $150
million to contribute. Despite severe criticism, the PCAOB has
remained intact since its creation by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002. 152 A recent study concluded the PCAOB increased the
overall credibility of financial reporting. 153
The benefits of increased investor protection are difficult to
quantify since they only become apparent when a hedge fund
fails and investors are left empty-handed. However, since these
proposals build on existing widespread industry practices and
regulatory framework implemented elsewhere, the costs are not
so great as to outweigh the benefits.
CONCLUSION
Hedge funds provide an alternative method of investment for
high net worth individuals and institutional investors. After
years of operating largely without regulation, governments
around the world used the fallout of the financial crisis of 2008 to
introduce new regulation for the hedge fund industry. In the
United States, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 required most hedge
funds to register with the SEC and provide information about the
funds’ investment strategy, trading practices, leverage, assets
DUFF & PHELPS, supra note 95.
Rogers, supra note 68; Maxey, supra note 47.
150
About the PCAOB, supra note 142.
151
Id.
152
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act continues to face hostility despite “acquiescence or
even mild praise by those most directly affected” by it. John C. Coates & Suraj
Srinivasan, SOX After Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review, 28 ACCT. HORIZONS
627, 628–29 (2014).
153
The study concluded the introduction of the PCAOB and its inspection
regime increased capital-market responses to firms’ earnings surprises, indicating
the audit oversight regime enhanced the credibility of reported earnings. Brandon
Gipper et al., Public Audit Oversight and Reporting Credibility: Evidence from the
PCAOB Inspection Regime 39–40 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 21530, 2016).
148
149

FINAL_FARRELL

172

9/10/2018 1:54 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:149

under management, and valuation practices. This information
assisted the U.S. government in learning more about the
industry and in monitoring for systemic risk. However, the
legislation left more to be desired in its aim to increase investor
protection.
Shortly after the passage of Dodd-Frank, the JOBS Act of
2012 removed the solicitation ban, allowing hedge funds to reach
a broader base of potential investors through advertising. This
change, along with the general “retailization” of hedge funds,
increased the number of institutional investors in hedge funds,
such as public and private pension funds and charitable and
educational endowments.
In Europe, the European Council approved the AIFMD, a
sweeping piece of legislation that aimed to increase investor
protection, monitor systemic risk, and provide common standards
for hedge funds doing business in Europe. Among its directives,
the AIFMD provided detailed requirements for independent
hedge fund valuation.
The U.S. government should follow the AIFMD’s lead in
requiring greater standardization and transparency of hedge
fund valuation. The United States should require hedge funds to
either engage external valuation experts to value their assets or
at least require that funds create and document valuation
functions that are as independent as possible from the portfolio
managers. This would increase investor protection by providing
investors with confidence in the valuations they see and also by
providing common metrics to compare funds. To ensure that the
external valuation experts are truly independent, Congress
should also create an industry governing body that would have
the power to inspect the external valuation expert’s reports,
accredit valuation experts, and issue valuation standards for the
industry. Together, these measures would strengthen confidence
in hedge fund valuations and improve investor protection for the
millions of Americans who rely on hedge funds for their financial
security.

